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commentary
Defining Hypnosis: Process, Product, and the Value of 
Tolerating Ambiguity
Wagstaff (this issue) points to differences 
among and within general definitions of hyp-
nosis, such as those in dictionaries, and tech-
nical definitions of hypnosis, such as those by 
professional and scientific groups.  Wagstaff 
argues that definitions of hypnosis should be 
consistent across lay and scientific contexts 
and should be based on the etymological ori-
gins of the terms in question.  He considers 
that defining hypnosis as an ‘altered state of 
consciousness’ would resolve issues that have 
prevented an accepted understanding of the 
phenomenon.  Although we are comfortable 
with the definitional centrality of an altered 
state of consciousness, we consider that defi-
nitions should be built in large part on data 
and we are reasonably relaxed about ambi-
guities and inconsistencies.
Theoretical and conceptual disagree-
ments have characterised the field and 
definition of hypnosis since its beginning 
(McConkey, 2005, 2008).  These differences, 
however, have not prevented significant ad-
vances in understanding and using the phe-
nomenon.  Generations of researchers have 
progressed from characterising the proper-
ties of hypnotic phenomena, to using hyp-
nosis as a tool for investigating other aspects 
of human behaviour and experience, and to 
developing validated adjunct treatments for a 
range of clinical conditions (Nash & Barnier, 
2008).  
Although we are generally comfortable 
with Wagstaff’s definition of hypnosis, we be-
lieve that, rather than focusing on ideological 
or etymological reasoning, a more productive 
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approach to establishing definitions is by 
‘pushing up’ from available empirical evi-
dence; although researchers need to know 
where they are pushing towards, that does not 
need to be overly specified.  When consider-
ing most current definitions of hypnosis, we 
have progressed beyond earlier ones because 
we can draw on a large corpus of data from 
many years of rigorous empirical work, often 
from multiple theoretical perspectives.  The 
current task then is to refine and advance by 
linking ideas to empirical evidence.
Wagstaff argues that an altered state of 
consciousness, characterised by “changes in 
sensations, perceptions, thoughts, or behav-
iour” (p. 92) should be a central feature of a 
definition of hypnosis; notably, however, he 
refers to an “alleged” altered state of con-
sciousness (p. 102).  This definition focuses 
on participants’ phenomenal experiences 
and recognises that although specific stimuli 
or social interactions (e.g., a hypnotic induc-
tion; the presence of a hypnotist) may facili-
tate hypnosis, the most important factor that 
allows one to say that hypnosis has occurred 
is that individuals’ subjective experiences of 
themselves and the world are altered in ways 
that they ordinarily would not be altered.  We 
are agnostic about whether the term ‘altered 
state of consciousness’ is the best descriptor 
of the changes that participants undergo in 
hypnosis, especially since this phrase itself is 
poorly defined and has been used to represent 
a variety of different positions (Kihlstrom, 
2005; Kirsch, 2011).  That aside, we agree with 
the importance of highlighting alterations in 
Commentary: On the Centrality of the Concept of an Altered State to Definitions of 
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participants’ phenomenal experience in any 
definition of hypnosis (see also McConkey, 
2005; Nash, 2005)
Some of the confusion that exists among 
and between definitions is because of dif-
ferent emphases on what the hypnotist does 
versus what the individual experiences.  This 
distinction between hypnosis-as-procedure 
(what leads an individual to alterations in 
experience and behaviour) and hypnosis-as-
product (those subjective effects) is a useful 
one to make.  Wagstaff’s definition contains 
both these elements with the emphasis on 
hypnosis-as-product.  In many lay definitions 
and in some theoretical positions the empha-
sis is on hypnosis-as-process.  In our view the 
emphasis should be on hypnosis-as-product. 
We are not saying that the process, primar-
ily the hypnotic induction, is not important; 
rather, we are saying the induction is only one 
element that together with the hypnotic abil-
ity of the individual may or may not lead to 
alterations in experience.
As Wagstaff indicates, an induction is “a 
procedure designed to induce or bring about 
hypnosis” (p. 102).  Importantly, Wagstaff does 
not claim that the induction is a necessary re-
quirement for hypnosis to occur.  Below we 
review data that shows that in some cases the 
induction has a profound effect on hypnotiz-
able participants’ experiences whereas in oth-
ers it has little facilitative effect.  An analogy 
may help to illustrate how an induction may 
relate to hypnosis-as-product.  Drawing on 
the work of Shor (1970), we note that for many 
individuals the experience of hypnosis is akin 
to becoming absorbed in a book or watching 
a movie.  Individuals differ in their capacity 
to have such experiences and there are situ-
ational factors that can influence the chances 
of this happening.  We liken a movie theatre 
to the laboratory or clinic in which a hypnotic 
induction is administered; that is, an environ-
ment that is specifically associated with a par-
ticular type of experience (watching a movie / 
being hypnotised).  The procedure of the lights 
dimming just before a movie starts is simi-
lar to a hypnotic induction and the events of 
the film are similar to hypnotic suggestions. 
As the film begins, people quieten and focus 
their attention, leading to a greater likelihood 
of becoming absorbed in the film.  For some 
audience members, this procedure may have 
little effect and they may ‘watch’, but not be-
come absorbed in the movie.  Others may 
become quickly absorbed, even if they have 
missed the dimming of the lights, because 
of their ability to focus and suspend disbe-
lief.  Similarly, an induction may increase the 
chances of some individuals becoming hyp-
notised, but it is not crucial for hypnosis-as-
product to occur for those who have a high 
level of hypnotic ability.  Finally, although the 
movie theatre is a strong cue for absorption, 
an individual may get caught up in a movie in 
any number of contexts — watching at home, 
in an airplane, or even on a mobile device. 
Similarly, although a laboratory or clinic may 
strongly cue the experience of hypnosis, it is 
not a necessary requirement for hypnosis-as-
product to occur for some individuals if they 
choose to have the experience.  The key point 
is that although an induction procedure is 
an important cue that can increase hypnotic 
responding, it is not a sufficient criterion by 
which to define the occurrence of hypno-
sis.  In fact, the relationship between process 
and product can be complex, and that can be 
seen across various studies; we will give three 
examples.
Connors et al. (2012) administered a sug-
gestion based on clinical face processing im-
pairments to participants with and without 
a hypnotic induction.  Participants who re-
ceived an induction were more likely to mis-
identify their own face following the sugges-
tion compared to those who did not receive 
an induction.  In this case, the induction 
strongly influenced participants’ behaviour 
and subjective experiences.  
McConkey, Szeps, and Barnier (2001) gave 
individuals a suggestion to experience them-
selves as the opposite sex following either 
an induction or an imagination instruction 
given in the hypnotic setting.  Participants 
were equally likely to respond to the sugges-
tion regardless of whether they received a for-
mal induction or an imagination instruction. 
However, their subjective experiences did 
vary.  Those who received an induction expe-
rienced a faster onset of the suggested effects 
than those in the imagination condition.  This 
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is consistent with the notion that although an 
induction may facilitate hypnotic experience, 
their own hypnotic ability and other contex-
tual cues may be sufficient for some individu-
als to experience subjective alterations.  
Polito, Barnier, Woody and Connors 
(2014) investigated participants’ responses 
with and without an induction across ideo-
motor, challenge, and cognitive suggestions. 
Participants who received an induction were 
more likely to pass suggestions, although 
some passed without an induction.  Notably, 
however, for those who passed each sugges-
tion, alterations to experience in terms of 
reductions in feeling of control, were simi-
lar whether or not they had received a hyp-
notic induction.  In this case, an induction 
influenced participants’ behaviour but not 
the phenomenal experience of those who re-
sponded to the suggestions.
Overall, these data show that partici-
pants’ experiences of hypnosis are not simple 
responses ‘switched on’ at the beginning of a 
session by an induction.  Most participants 
in these studies experienced hypnosis-as-
product because they had the ability to do 
so, and the relevance of an induction proce-
dure was dependent on the specific context. 
In some cases, an induction had an effect on 
behaviour and experience; in other cases the 
effect was minimal or subtle.  These data un-
derscore that whereas hypnosis-as-product is 
central to the definition of hypnosis, the place 
of hypnosis-as-procedure in any definition is 
less straightforward.  
The roles of a hypnotic induction, of hyp-
notic ability, and of specific hypnotic sugges-
tions in producing alterations in experience 
and behaviour will be part of the continued 
debate, and we are comfortable with defini-
tional and theoretical plurality (McConkey, 
2005).  The domain of hypnosis as a research 
area is broad and different researchers have 
been working to explain different parts of the 
phenomenon.  Although we may have been 
operating with a variety of theoretical and 
definitional frameworks, we all have discov-
ered some part of the truth.  The significant 
progress of the field, despite these differences, 
demonstrates that science can tolerate ambi-
guity; in fact, the tolerance of ambiguity may 
be essential in advancing science (McConkey, 
2005).  In defining hypnosis, an understand-
ing of process and product, and a tolerance 
of ambiguity will move us toward a defini-
tion that is consistent with the data, useful 
for generating new insights, and reasonably 
articulates what the phenomenon is and what 
it is not.
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